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PART I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Unless you have been living under a rock for the past fifteen years you have undoubtedly 
noticed that internet commerce has blossomed into a driving engine in the economy.
1
  Property 
rights have been rapidly evolving thanks in large part to the birth of the internet, and the 
accompanying technological and intellectual property creations that were created as a result.  
With this new technology came savvy businesspeople that looked to the internet to turn a profit.  
Forward thinking internet users registered domain names early on in hopes of selling for profit. 
Creditors have utilized domain names as security for debts.  This comment will focus on 
property rights in domain names, namely that of a creditor.     
Property is a legal creation that has been viewed as “an abstract right or legally-
constructed relationship among people with respect to things”2 or “a bundle of rights, powers, 
                                                 
1
 Internet World Stats:  Usage and World Population Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm 
(last visited April 1, 2010) (The number of users on the internet has gone from 16 million, or .4% of the world’s 
population in 1995 to 1.8 billion, or roughly 26.6% of the world’s population in December 2009). 
2
 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 22-23 (1913) (characterizing property as legal relations between and among legal subjects); see also Thomas 
Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1055-56 (1989) (explaining concept of property has changed 
from things of ownership to bundle of sticks theory). See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, 
PROPERTY (4th ed. 1998). 
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privileges and immunities that define one’s relationship to a resource.”3  These concepts have 
generally proven useful for normal property rights, but domain names have proven more 
complicated, causing courts to struggle whether or not domain names fall under these concepts.  
Property rights in domain names have been a problem that the e-generation and Congress have 
wrestled with since the internet became a profitable revenue source.
4
  The courts have also 
struggled in deciding whether domain names are governed under property law or contract law.
5
   
In 1999, Congress enacted the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) 
to help establish certain rights for parties.
6
  This Act only settled a few issues, while leaving 
many to the discretion of future statutory laws and case decisions.
7
 
Part II of this comment will give a brief explanation of domain names and the rights that 
accompany them.  It is necessary to understand some of the underpinnings of domain names so 
that we may know what rights, if any, are associated with them.     
Part III of this comment will discuss the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act (“ACPA”) 
of 1999.  The ACPA is an extremely important piece of legislation that drastically altered the 
rights in a domain name  
Part IV of this comment will discuss core principles of property rights and how those 
rights translate to domain names.  This section will also address how courts have differed on 
their opinions on what a domain name is and what rights a domain name holder has.   
                                                 
3
 Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 716 
(1993)  (“In theory, the term [property] does not refer to any object or to any necessary set of legal rights that always 
inheres in a property relationship. Instead, the term refers to a bundle of rights—rights that define, singly or 
collectively, the relationship of an individual to a resource.”);  see also A. Mechele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: 
The Evolving Nature of Property of the Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 287 (1999) (defining property). 
4
 See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc. 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) (commenting on how 
cybersquatting was a problem because people registered trademarked names for profit). 
5
 See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 85-87 (Va. 2000).   
6
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (1999). 
7
 See generally Infra, accompanying notes. 
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 Part V of this comment will deal with using domain names as collateral in a security 
instrument under Article 9 of the UCC.  This section will also address some bankruptcy 
implications should a domain name holder file for bankruptcy.   
Part VI concludes this comment by reconciling the different laws that can be used to 
enforce one’s property rights in the virtual world.  
 
 
PART II:  BACKGROUND 
Before delving into an analysis of the property rights that accompany domain names, it is 
necessary to explain what a domain name is and how the Domain Name System (DNS) Works.  
Any website is essentially an organized and interactive presentation of data that comes from a 
“host” computer.8  All internet websites are distinguishable by either an “Internet Protocol 
Address” (IP Address) or an alphanumeric domain name to differentiate one user from the next.9  
Each computer has its own IP address, similar to that of a telephone number.  For instance, 
Nike’s website IP address is <66.54.56.30> and its domain name is www.nike.com.10  The IP 
address specifies not only the exact computer, but also where on that computer the information is 
stored.  Therefore, a user can request another’s stored information so long as they have the 
proper IP address.
11
 
As convenient as it is to easily access stored information by using a long string of 
integers, using easily memorable words and phrases is much easier.  Therefore, the internet norm 
has become to send a request to one of the more than 500,000 “domain-name servers” in the 
                                                 
8
 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999). 
9
 Id. 
10
 Nike, http://www.nike.com (last searched March 31, 2010). 
11
 See Ned Snow, The Constitutional Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 76 
(2005) (explaining how IP addresses are used to contact specific computers to access their information). 
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world.
 12
   These servers are computers that translate the domain name into the properly 
corresponding IP addres which the user is seeking.
13
  All domain names are broken down into 
three parts.
14
  The first part, the top-level domain name (“TLD”), is the part of the domain name 
at the far right.
15
  The more common TLD’s include: .com, .net, .edu, .gov, and .org.16  The next 
level of the domain name is the second-level domain name (“SLD”)17.  This can be any 
alphanumeric combination so long as it has not been registered with the TLD of your choice.  
There may be more than one SLD, but these names are just to reference more specific “sub-sites” 
within the website you are accessing.  For instance, the Seton Hall University’s website is 
http://shu.edu.
18
 However, if you want to access the law school at Seton Hall it would be located 
at http://law.shu.edu
19
.   
Most businesses use the “.com” TLD.20  Therefore, one could intuitively search for a 
company or specific product by typing in the name or product as the SLD and “.com” as the 
TLD.
21
  Because of the ease at which internet traffic can access a website whose domain name is 
a popular word, name, or phrase, certain domain names became highly coveted for their and 
valuable.  Nowadays, a valuable domain name can fetch prices in the millions of dollars.
22
   
                                                 
12
 See Christopher P. Rains, A Domain by Any Other Name: Forging International Solutions for the Governance of 
Internet Domain Names, 14 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 355, 362 (2000). 
13
 Snow, supra note 103 at 16. 
14
 Juliet Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 95, (2003). 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id.; See also http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by-domain.txt (The full list of top level domain names is held by 
ICANN).  
17
 See Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 872.   
18
 Seton Hall University, http://shu.edu (last visited April 22). 
19
 Seton Hall Law School, http://law.shu.edu (last visited April 22). 
20
 See http://www.godaddy.com/domains/searchresults2.aspx?ci=16811 (A search for any unregistered SLD reveals 
that “.com” is the most popular TLD). 
21
 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E. 2d 80, 83 (Va. 2000) (Note also that cursory searches for 
books.com  and shoes.com revealed Barnes and Nobles and Zappos, respectively.) 
22
Bianca Bosker, 11 Most Expensive Domain Names Ever, Huffington Post, March 3, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/10/the-most-expensive-domain_n_493870.html#s73393 (last visited 
February 22, 2010) (Insure.com was sold in 2009 to QuinStreet for $16 million dollars); see also Greg Johnson, The 
Costly Game for Net Names, L.A. Times, Apr. 10, 2000, at A1. 
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To gain the right to use a domain name you must request to register the specific name 
you seek to hold through a registrar.
23
  The registrar then reserves the domain name through the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”).24  ICANN is a non-profit 
corporation whose sole purpose is to manage the DNS.
25
 
At one point, all domain names using the “.com,” “.org,” “.net,” and “.edu” suffixes have 
historically been established by registration with an organization called Network Solutions, Inc. 
(“NSI”).26  NSI, no longer has the exclusive registration rights of these popular TLD’s, but it is 
still one of the most popular registrars in the world.
27
   
 
PART III – ANTI-CYBER SQUATTING PROTECTION ACT 
Before the ACPA Enactment 
In the early 1990’s, forward thinking internet users became aware of the potential value 
in domain names.
28
  These users sought out to actively register domain names that they knew 
could be sold for profit in the future
29
.  Some of these users sought out generic names like 
                                                 
23
 See Jane K. Winn, Crafting a License to Know from a Privilege to Access, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 285, 302 (2004).   
24
 Id.   
25
 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND  
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm (last visited April 20, 2010). 
26
 Robert L. Tucker, INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY ROBBERY: THE TORTIOUS MISUSE OF LINKS, 
FRAMES, METATAGS, AND DOMAIN NAMES, 4 Va. J.L. & Tech. 8, 14 (1999). 
27
  Network Solutions Company History, http://about-networksolutions.com/corporate-history.php (last visited April 
21, 2010) (NSI was acquired by Verisign, Inc. in 2000. Verisign subsequently sold NSI in 2003 to Pivotal Equity 
Group but retained the registry business which had been originally created within Network Solutions prior to 
VeriSign's acquisition of the company). 
28
 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003); See also Julia Angwin, LOVE'S LABOR LOST - Online 
matchmaker still seeks love, money, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1998/02/12/BU57PER.DTL&hw=Business+Week+Online&sn=204&sc=271;  
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,182646,00.html (last visited April 1, 2010) (Gary Kremen registered sex.com 
and match.com, amongst many other popular named websites from Network Solutions in the early 1990’s.  He later 
went on to sell match.com for $7 million and sex.com for about $12 million). 
29
 See supra, note 12. 
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“match.com”, “sex.com”, and “jobs.com”30.  These “internet prospectors” realized the value 
popular domain names would hold once the internet fully developed.   
Other internet users sought to make a profit off domain names in a more unsavory 
manner.  Those people are called “cybersquatters”.31  A cybersquatters is a person that registers a 
trademarked name or name very similar to a trademark named as a domain name with the 
intention of (1) extorting money from the trademark owner by registering the trademarked name 
first; (2) luring someone to a site spelled very similar to the trademarked name on the off-chance 
that someone misspelled the trademarked website; or (3) storing the name until someone with the 
intention of using it comes forward and realizes the cybersquatter has registered it already at 
which point the cybersquatter offers to sell the site for an usurious profit .
32
 
One of the earliest instances of cybersquatting was in Intermatic v. Toeppen and 
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen (collectively referred to as “the Toeppen cases”).33  In 
1995 Dennis Toeppen, an individual residing in Illinois, registered more than 200 domain names 
including “Panavision.com”, “Panaflex.com”, and “Intermatic.com”.34  Both Panavision 
International, L.P. and Intermatic, Inc. brought separate suits against Toeppen in November 1996 
alleging trademark dilution.
35
  Both plaintiffs in the Toeppen cases exercised personal 
                                                 
30
 Ron Jackson, Be Careful what You Wish For: The Continuing Saga of Gary Kremen and Sex.com, 
http://www.dnjournal.com/cover/2006/march.htm (last visited April 20, 2010) (All three of these sites were actually 
registered by the same man, Gary Kremen). 
31
 Wisegeek, What is a Cybersquatter?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-cybersquatter.htm (last visited April 13, 
2010) (explaining that “Cybersquatting is the act of registering domain names, especially those connected with 
celebrities or recognizable trademarks, with the intention of reselling them at an inflated price. A cybersquatter takes 
advantage of the domain registration companies' 'first come, first served' policy by submitting a large list of very 
popular words and names all at once. While the domain registration company is in the process of entering these 
names, the cybersquatter uses profits from individual domain resales to finance the required registration fees”). 
32
 See Cynthia A. R. Woollacott, Name Dropping: Recent Anti-cybersquatting Legislation Offers Some Relief to 
Trademark Holders, 23 L.A. Law. 28, 29 (2000) (explaining the types of registration activities of cybersquatters). 
33
 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 
(N.D. Ill. 1996). 
34
Intermatic, 947 F.Supp. at 1236.    
35
 Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1319; Intermatic, 947 F.Supp. at 1229. 
Jeffrey Wiedmann 
Page 7 of 29 
 
jurisdiction on Toeppen by gaining jurisdiction from his registration of the domain names.
36
  In 
both cases, the courts held that Toeppen had diluted the respective companies’ marks and 
prevented the rightful mark owners from selling their goods and services by registering the 
marks as domain names.
37
   
Most courts tended to follow suit of the Toeppen cases.
38
  If a registrant was using a 
domain name that was a mark holder’s name with the intention of profiting off the mark, they 
were found to be infringing on the mark holder’s rights.  However, not all cybersquatting cases 
were as successful as the Toeppen cases were. 
Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Porsche.com was an important step toward 
rectifying the problem cybersquatters imposed on rightful mark holders.
39
 When trademark 
holders discovered that their trademark was already registered as a domain name by a 
cybersquatter, they normally sought an in personam action against the offending party
40
.  
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in these actions often found out that the domain name was registered 
under a fictitious name or by someone outside United States jurisdiction
41
.  Porsche Cars North 
America Inc. (“Porsche”) sought a different approach.  Unlike its predecessors who tried to file 
in personam actions against the offending domain names, Porsche filed an in rem action against 
the domain names, stating that the domain names violated the Trademark Dilution Act.
42
   
                                                 
36
 Id. 
37
 Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1327; Intermatic, 947 F.Supp. at 1240. 
38
 See, e.g., The N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Finding infringement where an accountant set up a website using the trademark of his competitor 
as his domain name);  Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999) (Following the Toeppen 
cases, the registered domain names did not constitute infringement because the defendant did not have the trademark 
in mind when registering the domains).   
39
 Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 51 F.Supp.2d at 707 (1999).   
40
 See e.g. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327;  Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227. 
41
 See Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to the Future, 72 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 95, 122 (2003) (explaining how “cyberpirates” do not want to be found so they register their domain names 
using fictitious names or addresses). 
42
 Porsche, 51 F.Supp.2d at 709. 
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This was a novel approach on behalf of Porsche.  Registrants of allegedly infringing 
domain names could hide behind fictitious registered names, but the domain name still had to be 
registered with a domain name registrar
43.  Porsche’s theory was that if you could find a domain 
name’s registrant infringing on your rights but could not obtain jurisdiction over the registrant at 
least you could always take action against the registrar.
44
   
However, the Eastern District Court of Virginia held that the Trademark Dilution Act 
does not permit in rem proceedings.
45
  The court noted that the Trademark Dilution act only 
protects against “another person’s” commercial use of the mark, and assessed money damages 
against a “person” who willfully dilutes the mark.46  Therefore, only in personam jurisdiction is 
available when seeking relief under this Act.
47
  Because the Trademark Clause was read to not 
permit in rem actions against the cybersquatters, the court dismissed Porsche’s case against the 
defendants.
48
 
 
ACPA and the End of Cybersquatting 
To combat the bad faith registering of domain names, such as the example of 
Porsche.com, Congress enacted the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act (“ACPA”) in 1999.49  
The intent of the act is to “protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth of 
online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-
                                                 
43
 Moringiello, supra note 146, at 122. 
44
 Porsche, 51 F.Supp.2d at 709. 
45
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (provides, in pertinent part: 
“(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the 
court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade 
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection…” (emphasis added)). 
46
 Porsche, 51 F.Supp.2d at 712. 
47
 Id.   
48
 Id. at 713.   
49
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d).   
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faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as internet domain names with the intent to 
profit from the goodwill associated with such marks-a practice commonly referred to as 
‘cybersquatting’”.50   
To put a halt to cybersquatters and their abusive actions toward mark holders, the ACPA 
cybersquatters “liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name which 
is protected as a mark…[if] that person….has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, 
including a personal name.”51  The statute proceeds to name a non-exclusive list of factors to 
determine whether bad faith exists, including whether the person had a trademark or other 
intellectual property associated with the domain name, whether domain name consists of the 
person’s legal or commonly used name, or whether the person has used the name with a bona 
fide service.
52
 
One of the most important features of the ACPA is that it allows parties to institute in 
rem actions against the cybersquatter.
53
  If a plaintiff succeeds in its in rem action against the 
offender, the domain name will be seized by the court “forcing the Registrar of the domain name 
to deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court’s control and authority 
regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name.”54  The court’s seizure 
                                                 
50
  Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10066(HB), 2000 WL 973745, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 13, 
2000) (citing S.Rep. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999)). 
51
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d). 
52
Id. (stating that a cybersquatter “shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name 
which is protected as a mark under this section, if…that person…has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, 
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section.”).  But see Schmidheiny v. Weber, 146 F. 
Supp. 2d 701, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Arguing that the ACPA “reaches any name of ‘another living person,’ 
irrespective of whether that name has become a protectable mark”. The court further held that the registration of 
another person's name will subject the registrar to civil liability when done with an intent to profit).  
53
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)( 2)(A) (“The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the 
judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that 
registered or assigned the domain name is located…”). 
54
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
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of the domain name then provides the mark holder the ability to attach a judgment to the domain 
name so that the name can be transferred to the mark holder.
55
   
The passage of the ACPA provides mark holders with a definite and conclusive remedy 
against cybersquatters through the court system
56
.  Plaintiffs like Porsche who had no remedy 
pre-ACPA against infringing domain names now had a cause of action against them.
57
  
Cybersquatters who registered trademarked domain names in the hopes of profiting off the party 
with a trademark were no longer able to hide behind the guise of a fictitious name or across 
borders
58
.  If a plaintiff could not find the cybersquatter and acquire personal jurisdiction, they 
could now exercise in rem jurisdiction over the domain name.
59
 
The only major restriction on the ACPA is that a mark holder cannot prevail under the 
ACPA unless the registrant is found to have registered the mark as a domain name with a bad 
faith intention to profit from that mark
60
, the domain name is confusingly similar to a mark
61
, or 
is a registered trademark or name
62
.  This requirement precludes applying the ACPA to common 
or generic names and words.
63
 
                                                 
55
15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(C); see also Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d at 500 (requiring 
transfer of infringing domain name). 
56
 See generally 15 U.S.C. §1125(d).   
57
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that: (I) in the case of a mark 
that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; 
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or 
confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or (III) is a trademark, word, or name protected.) 
58
 15 U.S.C. (d)(2)(A) (“The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name”) 
59
 Id. 
60
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
61
 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I-II). 
62
 Id. 
63
 Golf Warehouse, L.L.C. v. Golfer's Warehouse, Inc., 142 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1312 (D.Kan.,2001) (holding that the 
name “Golfers' Warehouse” is generic, and therefore one parties use of the name for their company does not 
constitute cybersquatting against the other party). 
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 The first interpretation of the ACPA at the appellate level was the case Sporty’s Farm 
L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market.64  The defendant in Sporty’s Farm registered his competitor’s 
trademarked name as a domain name.  The Second Circuit applied the bad faith factors of the 
ACPA and found that the defendant registered the domain name www.sportys.com in bad faith 
with the intent to profit from the name.
65
   The court then affirmed the lower court’s decision to 
“order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to 
the owner of the mark”66 
 
Bosh v. Zavala:  Does the ACPA Contradict Itself? 
Bosh v. Zavala is a recent case coming out of the Central District of California where the 
ACPA was applied in an unconventional manner.
67
  Bosh dealt with a cybersquatter who 
registered over 800 domain names of professional athletes and famous companies, including that 
of Chris Bosh.
68
  Bosh alleged that Zavala registered the 778 domain names to generate revenue 
by posting hyperlinks on the websites.
69
  When an internet user would arrive at chrisbosh.com, or 
any of the other domain names registered by Zavala, and click on an advertisement, Zavala 
would be paid a commission.
70
    
                                                 
64
 Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, 202 F.3d 489 (applying the ACPA to a registrant who registered the 
domain name prior to the ACPA's enactment). 
65
 Id. at 499.   
66
 Id. at 500. 
67
 Bosh v. Zavala, C.D. Cal. No. 2:08-cv-04851, Amended Order (Sept. 29, 2009). 
68
 See Bosh Amended Order; Chris Bosh Players’ Page, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/chris_bosh/career_stats.html 
(Chris Bosh is an NBA basketball player for the Toronto Raptors.  He averages 20.2 points per game over his career 
and has made the NBA All Star Game four times) ( last visited April 3, 2010). 
69
 Bosh v. Zavala, C.D. Cal. No. 2:08-cv-04851, Complaint (July 24, 2009).   
70
 Id. 
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On July 23, 2008 Bosh filed a complaint solely on behalf of himself
71
 and won a 
judgment against the defendant in the amount of $120,000.00.
72
  However, Bosh was unable to 
locate Zavala or any of his assets to pay the judgment.
73
  To satisfy the judgment, Bosh sought a 
turnover order of not only his website, www.chrisbosh.com, but the 778 other registered domain 
names the defendant had registered as well.
74
  To receive the money Zavala owed through the 
judgment order, Bosh intended to have his web development company, Max Deal Technologies, 
manage the domain name and create a website for the person or company.
75
 Bosh stipulated in 
his ex parte application for turnover order that he would transfer the domain names to the 
rightful owner at no charge upon request whether or not they utilized the services of his 
company.
76
  The District Court Judge overseeing this case granted Bosh’s request and ordered a 
turnover of www.chrisbosh.com, as well as the 778 other illegally registered domain names to 
plaintiff.
77
  The Judge’s Order in favor of Bosh, although granted with good intentions, was a 
violation of the ACPA as well as California state law.
78
   
Recall that the ACPA defines a person in violation of the Act as one “who has a bad faith 
intent[ion] to profit from the mark”.79  At first glance, it does not seem that Bosh acted in bad 
faith by requesting the other 778 registered domain names to him because he was trying to 
                                                 
71
 Id.  (Bosh sued under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the California Right of Publicity Act 
(Cal. Civ. Code §3344). 
72
 Bosh v. Zavala, C.D. Cal. No. 2:08-cv-04851, Amended Order (Sept. 29, 2009). 
73
 Bosh v. Zavala, C.D. Cal., No. 2:08-cv-04851, Ex Parte Application for Turnover Order (September 15, 2009). 
74
 Id. (Under a typical turnover order, the Sheriff would levy on the property and sell at auction to satisfy judgment.  
Bosh argued that this would further cause harm to the third parties, because the purchasers would buy the domain 
names for uses similar to Zavala.)   
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Bosh v. Zavala, Amended Order. (Bosh was granted the other domain names in the capacity as a Trustee.  Bosh 
and his attorneys proposed to make reasonable efforts to contact the rightful owners of the websites and transfer 
control to them).   
78
 Palacio Del Mar Homeowners Ass'n v. McMahon, 174 Cal.App.4th 1386 (2009) (decided a few months before 
Bosh’s order was entered, the court held that domain names are not subject to turnover orders under California’s 
turnover statute). 
79
 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(1)(A)(1). 
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release these domain names from the grasps of Luis Zavala, an aggressive cybersquatter.  Bosh 
merely asked the court to allow him to be a “protector” of the domain names for the parties so 
that Zavala could not financially benefit off their names or goodwill anymore.
80
   
However, at a closer look one might think that Bosh does in fact fall under the “bad faith” 
umbrella of domain name holders as enumerated under the ACPA.
81
  The ACPA sets forth a list 
of factors in determining whether someone has a bad faith intent in registering a domain name.
82
  
One of the factors the court may use is whether the person has offered to “transfer, sell, or 
otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without 
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods 
or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct.”83 
Although the Order granting the turnover of domain names to Bosh was probably a 
violation of the ACPA, the Judge was short on options.  If she chose to have a normal sheriff’s 
sale, then the domain names could have been purchased by other contemplating cybersquatters, 
as Bosh’s attorneys warned.84  On the other hand, the Judge could not have sat idly by, leaving 
Zavala with control of the domain names.  By granting the domain names over to Bosh, at least 
then the court would have a responsible party accountable to transfer the domains to the right 
people.
85
   
The ACPA is by no means a cure all against cybersquatters.  As these cases point out, 
although mark holders are now able to institute in rem actions on the domain name, the plaintiffs 
                                                 
80
 Bosh v. Zavala, C.D. Cal., No. 2:08-cv-04851, Ex Parte Application for Turnover Order (September 15, 2009) 
(Stating that Bosh’s solution to transfer the domain names to him “would also serve to stop the ongoing harm to a 
large number of athletes and owners of the product names and entertainment properties whose rights are currently 
being violated, as well as to the public at large who are confused by Zavala’s illegal actions.”) 
81
 15 U.S.C. §1125 (d)(1)(B). 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Bosh v. Zavala, C.D. Cal., No. 2:08-cv-04851, Ex Parte Application for Turnover Order (September 15, 2009). 
85
 Id. (The Judge should have at least imposed conditions on Bosh that he was required to turn over the domain 
names upon request.) 
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are still left without an avenue to enforce monetary damages.  However, the ACPA does put an 
end to cybersquatters being able to manage infringing domain names against mark holders.   
 
PART IV:  PROPERTY RIGHTS OR CONTRACT RIGHTS IN DOMAIN NAMES? 
Introduction 
Domain names can be useful to satisfy judgments outside the scope of the ACPA as well.  
If a debtor were to have hold of a valuable domain name, a creditor could use a debtor’s domain 
name as leverage to satisfy a judgment.  One of the most popular methods creditors use is 
garnishing a debtor’s domain name for sale or to be directly turned over to the creditor.  As you 
will see below, this attempt to satisfy debts has been met with varying levels of success.     
 Creditors and debtors have been arguing over their rights long before the internet became 
commonplace.  An early case that dealt with judgment debtors arising out of New York is 
ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc.
86
  The creditor in ABKCO was unable to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the debtor, an English company.
87
  In attempt to circumvent this jurisdictional 
problem, the creditor sought a quasi-in-rem action against the debtor
88
 by attaching to a debt 
owed by a third party to the debtor.
89
  The third party in this case had a general licensing 
agreement to pay 80% of the profits received from the promotion.
90
 
                                                 
86
 ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films. Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899 (1976). 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id. (The judgment debtor in ABKCO was the licensor for the motion picture film “Let it Be”, featuring the 
Beatles.  The third party in this case was Apple Films, Inc., the company granted the license to promote the picture 
in America).   
89
see ABKCO Indus., 350 N.E.2d 899 (By virtue of CPLR 6202, an attachment under CPLR 6214 (subd [b]) is 
effective only if there is within the jurisdiction of our courts a debt or property of the debtor, here LTD, within the 
meanings of subdivisions (a) or (b) of CPLR 5201, which provide: 
“(a) Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, 
which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was 
incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non- resident, unless it is exempt from application to the 
satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing 
within or without the state. 
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 The court held that, because the agreement was assignable, the agreement was attachable 
property under New York State Law.
91
  The court labeled the licensing agreement “intangible 
personal property” and looked past the lack of physical location or concept of embodiment.92  
The fact that the debtor had an interest in the agreement was enough to allow the creditor to 
attach.
93
  Of importance to the concept of garnishing domain names, the court notes that there is 
“no threshold requirement that the attaching creditor show the value of the attached property or 
indeed that it even have any value”.94   
 The issues creditors faced in garnishing intangible property in ABKCO have permeated 
down to domain name litigation.  Courts and creditors alike still face the tough task of 
determining what remedies are available where the asset at issue is not easily classified.  There 
has been a split opinion by the courts on whether domain names should be classified as a 
contract for services
95
 or property capable of being garnished.
96
   
 
Umbro v. NSI – In Defense of Contract Rights 
 Before we get to Umbro v. NSI it is important to mention its prequel case, Dorer v. 
Arel.
97
  Rose Marie Dorer, the plaintiff, won a trademark infringement case against the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Property against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money judgment may be enforced against any 
property which could be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or interest and 
whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A money 
judgment entered upon *674 a joint liability of two or more persons may be enforced against individual property of 
those persons summoned and joint property of such persons with any other persons against whom the judgment is 
entered”). 
90
 ABKCO Indus., 39 N.Y.2d at 899. 
91
 Id. at 676.   
92
 Id. at 675. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. at 676.   
95
 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E. 2d 80 (Va. 2000). 
96
 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024.  
97
 Dorer v. Arel, 60 F.Supp.2d 558 (E.D.Va.,1999). 
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Brian Arel.
98
  The Judge found that defendant’s domain name “WRITEWORD.COM” was an 
infringement on plaintiff’s mark.99  The plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in damages and an order 
that the defendant be permanently enjoined from infringing on plaintiff’s trademark.100  
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the defendant never showed up in court or satisfied the judgment 
entered against him.
101
  Therefore, to satisfy the money judgment, the plaintiff got creative.  
Rose Dorer sought to obtain a writ of fieri facias
102
 against the debtor to satisfy the judgment out 
of the debtor’s property.  The plaintiff wanted to have the court order the registrar of the 
defendant’s domain name, in this case Network Solutions Inc., to transfer the domain name over 
to the plaintiff.
103
   
 The court examined the property characteristics of a domain name and noted reasons why 
a domain name should and should not be allowed to satisfy money judgments.
104
  First, the court 
states that where domain names consist of protected trademark names, trademark law should be 
invoked rather than personal property law.
105
  Trademarks are intellectual property not 
considered freely tradable on the open market.
106
 Because of this “a judgment creditor may not 
levy upon and sell a judgment debtor’s registered service mark or trademark.”107   
 The District Court in Dorer also notes that even if the domain name is not a trademark 
subject to trademark laws, the domain name may be only subject to contract rights instead of 
                                                 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Dorer, 60 F.Supp.2d at 559. 
102
 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.  2004) (“A writ of execution that directs a marshal or sheriff to seize and sell a 
defendant's property to satisfy a money judgment”). 
103
 Dorer, 60 F.Supp.2d at 558-559. 
104
 Id. 
105
 Id. at 560. 
106
 Id. at 561.   
107
 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions and Enforcements §148 (2010) (Note however, that in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, a trademark is a form of property which exists in connection with the goodwill or tangible assets of a 
business, and a trademark is thus an asset of a bankrupt's estate which is saleable in bankruptcy proceedings along 
with the bankrupt's goodwill or tangible business assets). 
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property rights.
108
  The court compares owning a domain name to owning a telephone number 
because both can be a valueless means of reaching a party, or an extremely valuable commercial 
tool.
109
  Dorer never ultimately answered the question of whether domain names can be subject 
to the writ of fieri facias because there were other remedies available to the plaintiff.
110
  The 
court deferred to the dispute policy in the NSI contract that states NSI has the sole discretion to 
“revoke, suspend, transfer or otherwise modify a domain name registration.”111  Therefore, the 
courts left the plaintiff to the avenue of self-help through the NSI contract.   
Shortly after Dorer v. Arel, the leading authority on creditor’s rights in domain names 
was decided in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc.
112
  In Umbro, the plaintiff 
Umbro International Inc. (“Umbro”) sued a company called 3263851 Canada Inc. (“Canada, 
Inc.”) for trademark infringement.113  The proceeding involved Canada, Inc. registering the 
judgment creditor’s trademarked name as the domain “umbro.com”.114   Umbro obtained a 
default judgment against Canada, Inc. and in an attempt to enforce the judgment, obtained a writ 
of fieri facias against Network Solutions from the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, the 
county where NSI
115
 was located.  NSI was the manager of 38 domain names registered by 
Canada, Inc.
116
  The plaintiff commenced a garnishment proceeding whereby they sought to have 
                                                 
108
 Dorer, 60 F.Supp.2d at 560-561. 
109
 Id.   
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. at 562. 
112
Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 81. 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. 
115
Network Solutions Company History, http://about-networksolutions.com/corporate-history.php (Network 
Solutions, Inc. is a corporation with its principal place of business in Herndon, Virginia.  It was granted the right in 
1992 by National Science Foundation to be the sole registrar of the most popular domains, including .com, .edu, 
.net, and .org.  Although it now shares this right with other registrars, NSI still holds most of the popular names.  
Therefore, the Umbro decision is especially significant in determining the property rights of domain names).   
116
 Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 81.   
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NSI deposit control of those names into the registry of the circuit court’s registry so that they 
could be advertised and sold to pay off the plaintiff’s judgment deficiency.117   
 Property is generally capable of being garnished when that property can be assigned or 
sold.
118
 To institute a garnishment proceeding under Virginia law a creditor must be able to show 
that the garnishee, in this case NSI, is liable to the judgment debtor, who was Canada, Inc.
119
  A 
liability, for garnishment matters, means to have a “legal obligat[ion]”, “enforceable by civil 
remedy,” “a financial or pecuniary obligation,” or a “debt”.120  The plaintiff posited that because 
NSI had an obligation to grant the exclusive right to the domain name to Canada, Inc. they 
therefore had a possessory interest over the domain name.
121
 
 The Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately refused to adopt the plaintiff’s position and 
decided that a domain registration is a contract for services not subject to garnishment.
122
  The 
court agreed with Umbro that a domain name registrant acquires the contractual right to use a 
domain name for the specified period of time as stated in the contract.
123
  However, the court 
refused to extend the ability to garnish the domain name because “a contract for services is not ‘a 
liability’ as that term is used in [Virginia’s Code]”.124  The Supreme Court of Virginia did not 
want to engage in a slippery slope where they would open up the flood gates and allow all 
                                                 
117
 Id. at 80.   
118
 Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1st Dep't 1980), order aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 
438 N.Y.S.2d 79, 419 N.E.2d 1078 (1981); Petty v. Moores Brook Sanitarium, 110 Va. 815, 67 S.E. 355 (1910). 
119
 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-511.  
120
 Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 85. 
121
 Id. at 85-86.   
122
 Id. at 86. (The Court relied on a Federal Case from Virginia called Dorer v. Arel, 60 F.Supp.2d 558 
(E.D.Va.1999).  The Plaintiff in Dorer also filed a writ of fieri facias against a judgment debtor, this time for a 
trademark infringement action.  Dorer refuses to decide whether a domain name ultimately is personal property 
subject to a lien of fieri facias and instead defers to NSI’s policy that allows NSI to place the domain name in a 
“hold” status, pending resolution of the dispute.  Once in a hold status, NSI has the right to “revoke, suspect, transfer 
or otherwise modify a domain name registration.”  Once cancelled, the complainant would be allowed to register for 
the domain name.  This self-help method was favored by the Court.) 
123
 Id.   
124
 Id. 
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services to be garnished.
125
  The court likened the right to use a domain name to satellite prepaid 
fees and stated “Umbro’s position would allow garnishment of the subscription service.”126   
 The dissent in Umbro believed the case revolved around whether the debtor had a 
possessory interest in the domain names registered with NSI.
127
  The dissent stated that since 
Canada, Inc. fulfilled all of its requirements to acquire the domain name and acquire the 
exclusive right over it, the debtor acquired a possessory interest over it.
128
  NSI’s position was 
that the debtor’s contractual rights were dependent on fulfilling an obligation, and therefore no 
liability arose to garnish.
129
  The dissent correctly points out that Canada, Inc. fulfilled all of its 
obligations to NSI, and therefore was guaranteed the right to the domain name for a period of 
two years.
130
  Therefore, the contractual right of the domain name was the property in which the 
debtor had a possessory interest and the plaintiff should have been able to garnish.
131
 
 Both courts in Dorer and Umbro heavily based their analysis on an incorrect 
understanding of how a domain name works and operates.  Recall that Dorer compared a domain 
name to being akin to a telephone number because both can be valueless without the user’s input 
creating value.
132
  This may be true for a telephone number, but not for a domain name.   
It is true that if websites were only searched by their IP addresses then the Dorer court’s 
analogy may hold, but when someone holds a domain name that is an easily memorable word or 
phrase such as “sex.com” or “money.com” that website will get a great amount of traffic no 
matter how much input the user adds.  If the court wanted to analogize domain names to a more 
                                                 
125
 Id. 
126
 Id. 
127
 Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 88. 
128
 Id. at 89. 
129
 Id. 
130
 Id. at 89. 
131
 Id. 
132
 Id. 
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graspable and concrete concept they should compare them to brick and mortar buildings
133
 in the 
sense that given two comparable storefronts, one located on Main Street will be much more 
valuable due to its easy accessibility and memorable location, than one on a desolate and 
unknown roadway.   
The Virginia Supreme Court also used faulty analogy to reach their holding when they 
compared domain names to a satellite service subscription.
134
  This comparison fares even worse 
for a domain name.  A satellite subscription service is a feed of television signals to the user.
135
  
Everybody who signs up for the satellite subscription service is entitled to the same benefits, 
assuming you sign up for the same television package.
136
  True, there are different levels of 
services that afford the subscriber higher levels of benefits, but the premise is still the same – the 
first in time first in right theory which makes owning the highly coveted domain names does not 
translate to satellite subscription services.  It does not matter if you subscribed to DirecTV today 
or ten years ago, the current value of your package will be the same.  However, if you went to 
NSI today to find a domain name that accurately represents the image or idea you hope to 
convey for your company, you are going to notice most familiar Second Level Domain Names 
for the most popular Top Levels are going to be registered already.   
Another issue to take up with the holding in Umbro is that the majority opinion is in 
contention with the provisions of the ACPA.  Recall that the ACPA allows for in rem actions 
against infringing domain names.
137
  To institute an in rem action against a thing though, it must 
                                                 
133
 No pun intended. 
134
 Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 86-87. (Although the Virginia Supreme Court does not outright compare 
domain names to satellite television subscription services, they do use the service as something comparable to 
convey the reasoning behind their holding.  In either regards, this is plainly wrong). 
135
 Tom Cruze, Satellite TV Service – A Short Look at the Details, http://ezinearticles.com/?Satellite-TV-Service---
A-Short-Look-at-the-Details&id=4128704 (last visited April 20, 2010).   
136
See Dish Network, http://www.dishnetwork.com/ (laying out the different prices for each subscription package). 
137
 See, 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1994).  
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be more than a contract for services
138
, which is what Umbro decided a domain name should be 
categorized as.  However, multiple district courts have noted that “[e]ven if a domain name is no 
more than data, Congress can make data property.”139 
 
Kremen v. Cohen – In Defense of Property Rights 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view of the rights associated with a 
generic domain name in Kremen v. Cohen.
140
  The asset at issue in Kremen was the sex.com 
domain name.
141
  In 1994 Gary Kremen registered sex.com to his business, Online Classified.
142
  
He used NSI to register his domain name.
143
  Since the modern internet was still in its infancy, 
there were very few security precautions established.
144
  Stephen Cohen, career conman was able 
to take advantage of this fact and conned NSI into transferring the sex.com domain name to 
him.
145
  Kremen sued Cohen and was awarded a judgment of $65 million in damages.
146
  
Kremen was unable to collect any of the judgment before Cohen was able to remove his assets, 
and remove himself from the country.
147
   
                                                 
138
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1655 (If an absent defendant does not appear or plead within the time allowed, the court may 
proceed as if the absent defendant had been served with process within the State, but any adjudication shall…affect 
only the property which is the subject of the action).  
139
 Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com,, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000); see also Cable News 
Network, L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492 (E.D. Va. 2001) aff'd in relevant part per curiam No. 02-
1112, 2003 WL 152846, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (unpublished opinion); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. 
technodome.com, No. CA-00-00714-A, 2000 WL 33666935, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2000); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 
Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000) (quoting the same passage but not in answer to a 
constitutional challenge). 
140
 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
141
 Id. 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. at 1025-1026. 
145
 Id. at 1026. 
146
 Id. at 1027. 
147
 Id. 
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Since Kremen was unable to ascertain Cohen’s whereabouts, he instituted a conversion 
claim against Network Solutions for the wrongful disposition of his domain name to Cohen.
148
  
Kremen alleged that NSI mishandled his domain name by granting the rights in the name to 
Cohen without first making an inquiry with Kremen.
149
  Whether Kremen had an actionable 
claim against NSI boiled down to the question of whether a registrant has a property right in a 
domain name.
150
   
To determine whether a property right exists, the court created a three-part test: (1) there 
must be an interest capable of precise definition; (2) it must be capable of exclusive possession 
or control; and (3) the putative owner must have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.
151
 
First, the court found that a domain name satisfied the first element because it is a well-
defined interest.
152
  The court analogized it to corporate stock or a plot of land in that those who 
are searching out the particular name or area know where to look.
153
  The court then found that it 
satisfied the second element as well in that it is capable of exclusive possession or control 
because the registrant alone has the ability to alter the website or transfer the domain name.
154
  
Finally, the court agreed that registrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity.  The Kremen 
court likened registering a domain name to “staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office.  It 
informs others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one else’s”.155   
The Ninth Circuit’s analogy that a domain name is more comparable to a plot of land, 
rather than a contract for services, should become instructive to future courts.  Professor Snow 
carries this analogy out further, arguing that (1) the registration agreement between registrar and 
                                                 
148
 Id. at 1029. 
149
 Id. at 1027. 
150
 Id. at 1029. 
151
 Id. at 1030. 
152
 Id. 
153
 Id. 
154
 Id. 
155
 Id. 
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registrant acts like a deed; (2) the webpage is similar to the structure or building that a landowner 
would build on a plot of land; (3) the registrar is like the administrative person (lawyer, real-
estate agent, title searcher) involved in facilitating the transaction; and (4) the government is like 
a real-estate seller because they originally created the rights to owning domains.
156
 
When this analogy is extended even further, the Kremen decision seems to be the only 
logical way to characterize domain names.  First, the registration agreement between registar and 
registrant is similar to a deed because both are instruments representing rights to space.
157
  Just 
as a deed is effective once delivered to the grantee, a registration agreement is effective once the 
registrant fills it out and receives confirmation from the registrar.
158
 
Second, the webpage that the registrant creates and builds upon is similar to the building 
a landowner constructs and builds.  Without either the building or website, it is impossible to 
access either space.  Also, when a developer builds an aesthetically pleasing building or web site 
that business stands a better chance at garnering more visitors. 
Third, the domain name registrar acts as the administrative people behind a land 
transaction.  In a real world land sale, lawyers draft up the deeds and title to the property and real 
estate agents match buyers to sellers.  In the “internet world” both of these functions are 
achieved through the registrar.   
Finally, the government acts like a seller of real-estate.  An unclaimed domain name 
exists in the public commons until a potential registrant claims it from the Government, the 
owner of the public commons, and takes title.
159
    
                                                 
156
 Ned Snow, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAILING OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT, 41 WMTLR 1, 53 
(2005). 
157
 Id. 
158
 Snow, supra notes 359-360 at 53-54, 
159
 Snow, supra notes 366-367 at 55.   
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Comparing an intangible domain name to something concrete and easily identifiable, 
such as a plot of land, is a tough task for Judges.  There has never been anything like web sites 
before.  Sure, there have been things and services we refer to that are not tangible (e.g. telephone 
number, satellite subscription, trademark) but all have shortcomings to prevent them from being 
characterized as property in the sense that land is property.  A domain name, on the other hand, 
does not have any of these shortcomings.  The only problem is that you cannot see and touch a 
domain name in the sense that you can see and touch land or personal property.  Until Judges are 
able to look past this hurdle, the conflict between categorizing domains as contracts for service 
or property will continue to be fought. 
 
PART V:  SECURITY INTERESTS IN A DOMAIN NAME 
Introduction 
With the proliferation of business being conducted on the internet, many companies have 
increasingly supported more and more of their companies with less physical property and more 
virtual property.  Because of the nature of internet business, companies like eBay and Amazon 
have very little physical capital other than the computers and servers with which they run their 
businesses.  Internet-related businesses very often consider a great portion of their business’s 
value their domain name and the goodwill associated with the name.
160
 
 
Security Interests Implications with Domain Names 
 As domain name have become more important in terms of value to companies and 
entrepreneurs, domain name holders have found ways to try and securitize their domains in 
                                                 
160
 Johnathan Krisko, U.C.C. Revised Article 9: Can Domain Names Provide Security for New Economy 
Businesses?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1178, 1179 (2001). 
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exchange for cash.
161
  For instance, the Industrial Bank of Korea established a lending program 
in the late 1990’s which allowed companies to post their domain names as collateral in exchange 
for up to 30% of the appraised value.
162
   
For a domain name to serve as a source of collateral for a creditor, Article 9 of the UCC, 
which has been adopted by all fifty states,
163
 must permit an enforceable security interest in the 
rights of the domain name.
164
  Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to security 
interests in personal property or fixtures by contract, sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment 
intangibles, promissory notes, and many other interests not relevant to this comment.
165
  Article 
9 however, does not apply to a lien unless it was created consensually.
166
  Therefore, in the cases 
mentioned earlier in previous sections where a judgment lien was ordered against debtors, 
Article 9 of the UCC would not have been an appropriate remedy.
167
  In fact, nearly every right 
of value a company has can be assigned as a consensual secured interest.
168
 
To be able to grant creditors a security interest in their domain names, the debtor must be 
able to have a transferable property right in the collateral.
169
  It is this power to transfer a right in 
the collateral that allows attachment to the domain name.
170
   
                                                 
161
 WARREN E. AGIN, BANKRUPTCY AND SECURED LENDING IN CYBERSPACE at ch. 11:1 (2005). 
162
 Id. 
163
 Uniform Commercial Code, Fifth Edition James J. White Robert S. Summers West Group Hornbook Series 
(2000 Third Edition). 
164
 See Jonathan C. Krisko, Recent Developments: U.C.C. Revised Article 9: Can Domain Names Provide Security 
for New Economy Businesses?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1178, 1181-82 (2001);  See also UCC 9-101 cmt.1 (“This Article 
supersedes former Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. As did its predecessor, it provides a comprehensive 
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures). 
165
 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (listing various categories of collateral within the scope of Revised Article 9) 
166
 UCC 9-109(d) 
167
 See Bosh v. Zavala, Complaint; Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d 80. 
168
 UCC 9-203(b) (“A security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the 
collateral only if: (1) value has been given; (2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in 
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A general intangible, as defined under UCC 9-102(a)(42) includes “personal property, 
including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit 
accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of 
credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction…[as well as] payment intangibles 
and software.
171
  Domain names fall under the term general intangible for UCC Article 9 
matters.
172
  Even if a court categorizes domain names as a contract for service it can still be used 
as collateral, and have a security interest created in it.
173
       
 So what happens when a debtor defaults and the creditor wishes to seek a transfer of the 
domain name to satisfy the debt?  When a company registers a domain name, long before it ever 
grants a consensual lien the domain name, it has to sign a contract with the registrar.
174
  Many of 
the registrars have clauses in their contracts that do not permit direct assignments.
175
  For 
instance, NSI has the following provision in its Domain Name Service Agreement: 
20. ASSIGNMENT AND RESALE. Except as otherwise set forth herein, your 
rights under this Agreement are not assignable or transferable. Any attempt by 
your creditors to obtain an interest in your rights under this Agreement, whether 
by attachment, levy, garnishment or otherwise, renders this Agreement voidable 
at our option. You agree not to reproduce, duplicate, copy, sell, resell or otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                             
PRAC. 423, 429 (2001). See generally Scott J. Driza, Perfecting Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 88 ILL. 
B.J. 162 (2000). 
170
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171
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172
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See Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Valley Bank NA (In re Omega Envtl., Inc.), 219 F.3d 984, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(characterizing general intangibles as “catch-all” category);  See also In re Remes Glass, Inc., 136 B.R. 132, 138 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding perfected security interest in general intangibles included telephone service 
rights). 
174
 See generally Network Solutions, Inc. Domain Name Service Agreement v. 8.6,  
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/static-service-agreement.jsp. 
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exploit for any commercial purposes any of the services (or portion thereof) 
without Network Solutions prior express written consent.
176
 
 
These clauses are meant to prohibit creditors from satisfying owed debts by transferring the 
domain names from the debtor.   
 Luckily for creditors put in this precarious situation, the UCC contains a clause that 
trumps anti-assignment provisions.  Section 9-408 of the UCC provides that a security interest 
may be granted in a general intangible, even if the debtor and a third party have entered into a 
contract prohibiting the assignment.
177
  However, UCC 9-408(d)(6) states this section of the 
UCC “does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest” in the domain name.178 
 So now the creditor is again stuck with few options.  They have an attached interest in the 
collateral, but they cannot seize it, due to the anti-assignment clauses and the limits placed under 
9-408 of the UCC.  One way to reach the collateral is to either hope the debtor goes into 
bankruptcy or force the debtor into an involuntary bankruptcy.
179
 
The United States Bankruptcy Code is concerned with property rights, mainly those of 
the estate.  Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines property rights of the estate as “all legal 
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or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”180  
According to legislative history, this definition includes, but is not limited to, contracts, 
trademarks, and causes of actions.
181
  Section 541(a) further provides that a debtor’s property is 
property of the estate “wherever located and by whomever held”.182   
The Bankruptcy Code has a longstanding respect for state law and as such, yields to it 
unless a bankruptcy law mandates otherwise.  Under United States v. Butner the Supreme Court 
stated that bankruptcy courts must look to state property and trademark law when considering 
property rights.
183
  Therefore, although certain principles hold true throughout the courts, the 
creditor must always be aware of the state laws where jurisdiction is held. 
A creditor who has a security interest should be able to claim proceeds from the sale of a 
domain name once the debtor’s estate is sold off by the trustee.  In re Chris Don Inc., the 
defendant granted a blanket lien in all his property, including intangible properties.
184
  The court 
held that the debtor’s liquor license, because it was intangible property, was included among the 
items covered by the blanket lien and entitled the creditor to collect from the proceeds of the sale 
of the license.
185
  Therefore, as long as the domain name is considered intangible property under 
the respective state’s law, the creditor should be entitled to the proceeds from the bankrupt 
debtor’s estate.   
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PART VI:  CONCLUSION 
 The constantly evolving property rights in domain names have ensured that courts will 
not come to a general consensus for years to come on how to treat them.  The right to a domain 
name is a unique right that really is not comparable to any other.  Although it looks like a general 
trademark or contract for a service, it is so much more complex.  It can be developed to attract 
millions of visitors or very little visitors.  It can be valued in the millions of dollars or only the 
price of the contract signed with the registrar.  These complexities make domain names destined 
to slowly enter the realm of property instead of contracts.   
